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In this paper, we examine how categorization is resisted. 
We analyze the way actors draw on cultural repertoires 
to resist or adapt to changes that will potentially alter 
the definition and nature of the markets in which they 
compete. We approach this question through a quali-
tative study of the heated debate over the new regula-
tion of over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets in 
Europe between 2010 and 2011. Our paper enriches 
the existing literature on the political nature of catego-
rization. Our results show that in response to unwanted 
change, incumbent firms try to create incommensura-
bility with their own industry’s standard cultural reper-
toire. Most importantly, this incommensurability is not 
argued in the name of any higher-order sets of values. 
Our main contribution lies in the article’s focus on the 
way powerful actors resist categorization, highlighting 
the link between forms of commensuration and the sta-
tus of the actors who attempt to instrument it.
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Abstract
In this paper, we examine how categorization is resisted. We analyze the way actors draw on cultural 
repertoires to resist or adapt to changes that will potentially alter the definition and nature of the mar-
kets in which they compete. We approach this question through a qualitative study of the heated debate 
over the new regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets in Europe between 2010 and 
2011. Our paper enriches the existing literature on the political nature of categorization. Our results 
show that in response to unwanted change, incumbent firms try to create incommensurability with their 
own industry’s standard cultural repertoire. Most importantly, this incommensurability is not argued in 
the name of any higher-order sets of values. Our main contribution lies in the article’s focus on the way 
powerful actors resist categorization, highlighting the link between forms of commensuration and the 
status of the actors who attempt to instrument it. 
Keywords
categories, categorization, commensuration, incommensurability, cultural repertoire, industry register
La transparence est-elle une vertu sur les marchés 
financiers de gré à gré? Résister aux catégories du 
régulateur par le saut hors du paradigme
Résumé
Ce papier traite de la résistance à la catégorisation. L’analyse montre comment les acteurs d’un marché 
utilisent des répertoires culturels pour résister ou s’adapter à des changements susceptibles d’affecter la 
nature et la définition même des marchés sur lesquels ils se trouvent en concurrence. Nous proposons 
une analyse qualitative du débat actuel sur la régulation des marchés financiers de gré à gré, en nous 
concentrant sur le cas européen et sur la période 2010-2011. Ce papier contribue à la littérature aca-
démique sur le caractère politique des processus de catégorisation. Nos résultats montrent comment, 
face à un changement non souhaité, les principales entreprises concernées sont amenées à revendiquer 
l’incommensurabilité de leur activité avec le répertoire culturel habituel de leur secteur d’activité. Cette 
incommensurabilité a la spécificité de ne pas prendre appui sur un répertoire de valeurs d’ordre supé-
rieur. Notre principale contribution concerne ainsi l’étude d’une stratégie mise en œuvre par des acteurs 
puissants pour résister à une catégorisation non souhaitée, ce qui nous permet de souligner le lien entre 
le statut des acteurs et les stratégies qu’ils ont à leur disposition dans les processus de commensuration.
Mots-clefs
catégories, catégorisation, commensuration, répertoire culturel, incommensurabilité, registre d’industries
Is transparency a value on OTC markets? 4/27
Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France
http://www.fmsh.fr - FMSH-WP-2014-55
Sommaire
Theoretical background 6
The concepts of categories and categorization 6
Categorization as a contested political process 7
Challenging industry registers to contest new categories 7
Methodology 8
Empirical setting 8
Data sources 9
Data analysis 11
Case study 11
OTC markets: Challenging the virtues of transparency 11
The argument of the specific nature of OTC markets 13
Discussion 17
References 19
Appendices 22
Appendix 1: Decision-making process in the European Union 22
Appendix 2 : Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2004/39/EC on the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) 23
Appendix 3: MiFID 2 Timeline 23
Appendix 4: The MiFID Consultation Paper, Wording of the questions 24
Is transparency a value on OTC markets? 5/27
Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France
http://www.fmsh.fr - FMSH-WP-2014-55
Categorization is crucial to the construction of markets and the way we make sense of the world (Dou-glas, 1986; Zerubavel, 1991, 1997). 
Categories impose coherence and create shared 
understandings (Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010; 
Lounsbury and Rao, 2004). They are considered 
as instances of commensuration as they provide 
a basis for comparison, commensurability and 
valuation (Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Zuc-
kerman, 1999, 2004). By influencing perception 
and interpretation, they act as institutions that 
facilitate trade, influence economic outcomes 
(Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010) and shape the 
identities and interests of actors (Lounsbury and 
Rao, 2004; Zhao, 2005). Categories define social 
and symbolic boundaries and rules for inclu-
sion (Lamont, 2001; Lamont and Molnar, 2002; 
Zhao, 2005). When they change, they can signi-
ficantly alter the nature of the markets in which 
actors compete. In many organizational fields 
such as the mutual fund industry (Lounsbury 
and Rao, 2004), the automobile industry (Rosa et 
al., 1999), the stock market (Zuckerman, 2000), 
or the worlds of art (DiMaggio, 1987) and music 
(Anand and Peterson, 2000), categorization has 
had a significant impact on social structure and 
social outcome (Zhao, 2005, p.196-197). Exis-
ting research not only demonstrates that catego-
rization is socially constructed (Kennedy, 2008) 
but also develops arguments as to how it confers 
social identities, signals actors’ social standing 
and involves political battles between different 
interest groups (Zhao, 2005, p.179). Categori-
zation always has a socio-political origin, reflec-
ting diverse values and interests. More recently, 
research on categorization has focused on how 
shared meanings of new market categories are 
established (Garud, Gehman and Karnoe, 2010) 
and how such meanings come to shape collec-
tive perceptions of value (Khaire and Wadhwani, 
2010, p.1281). All these analyses provide insights 
for our understanding of categorization from a 
sociological viewpoint.
Few studies, however, have closely examined the 
process of contesting attempts at categorization. 
Some research on change in categorization has 
concentrated on factors of durability, and argues 
that powerful actors often attempt to preserve the 
existing structure of categories (Lounsbury and 
Rao, 2004). Such research focuses on the politi-
cal dynamics of market classification (Loun-
sbury and Rao, 2004; Zhao, 2005), but has not 
examined the process and means whereby actors 
resist attempts to establish categorization. In par-
ticular, the literature on categorization provides 
little insight into the role played in the process by 
values and justifications (Boltanski and Thévenot, 
2006). The literature on cultural repertoires, how-
ever, (Weber and Dacin, 2011) has emphasized 
the way actors can draw on various cultural reper-
toires - or industry registers - for values that will 
allow them to influence the very categories they 
use for their self-definition (Rindova et al., 2011). 
In this paper, we examine the way different mar-
ket participants draw on cultural resources to 
resist or adapt to solutions that have the potential 
to significantly alter the definition and nature of 
the markets in which they compete. We analyze 
the way actors combine values and justifications 
for their own ends, and the use they make of their 
own field’s industry register. Overall, this study 
addresses three research questions about con-
testing categorization in markets, and political 
dynamics: What resources do actors use to con-
test categorization and a certain definition of the 
market? What is the role of industry registers in 
the contestation process? How do actors use val-
ues and cultural resources to attain their goal?
We address these questions through a case study 
of the proposed changes to OTC markets result-
ing from recent regulatory endeavours in Europe. 
Following the recent financial crisis, OTC mar-
kets have come under unprecedented worldwide 
regulatory pressure to move from their opaque 
bilateral transaction mechanism towards a more 
Walrasian mechanism in which competitive pro-
cesses should produce greater price transparency. 
Focusing on the European situation, we analyze 
the battle over categories involved in this new 
regulation process.
Our research is based on a qualitative study of the 
battle observed between 2010 and 2011 over the 
forthcoming OTC market regulation. The objec-
tive is to understand the actors’ intentions, their 
representation of the market, their metrics, their 
arguments, and their own interpretation of how 
regulation will change the market and what they 
think is desirable. We focus on the type of values 
and definitions used or promoted by various mar-
ket participants, mainly big investment banks and 
regulators. 
We show that resistance to the proposed regula-
tory categorization relies mainly on a definition 
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of the market’s nature that contradicts the defi-
nition put forward by the regulators, suggesting 
that the financial world’s traditional industry reg-
ister is irrelevant to the issue at stake. Specifically, 
the resistance-to-regulation period is reflected 
in opponents’ refusal to accept that the values of 
transparency and liquidity are relevant to pro-
moting OTC market efficiency, in blatant con-
tradiction to traditional market efficiency theory. 
We analyze this strategy as an attempt to cre-
ate incommensurables. We demonstrate that the 
instrumentation of incommensurability can take 
various forms, and their availability to the actors 
depends on the power they hold. 
In terms of contribution, our paper enriches the 
literature on the political nature of categorization 
(Lounsbury and Rao, 2004) and the idea that cat-
egories are products of political processes (Zhao, 
2005). We highlight the importance of cultural 
repertoires, and more specifically industry regis-
ters, in the process of contesting categorization. 
To resist an exogenous shock, actors drastically 
change their cultural repertoire by using new cul-
tural resources, which may contradict their tra-
ditional industry register. Like Espeland (1998), 
we find evidence that when facing unwelcome 
change, incumbent firms try to create incommen-
surability by challenging the cultural repertoire 
on which categories are built. 
The rest of this paper comprises four parts. First, 
we focus on the theoretical foundation of our 
research, mainly the literature on categorization, 
political action and the role of the cultural rep-
ertoires associated with this process. The second 
part of our paper describes our research method, 
a qualitative study over the period 2010-2011, 
based mainly on analysis of secondary data. We 
then study the case of proposed changes to OTC 
markets, the disputes over categorization and the 
way actors resist regulatory change. In the fourth 
and final part of the paper, we discuss the main 
conclusions of our research and its contribution. 
Theoretical background
The concepts of categories and 
categorization
According to Kennedy (2003), a category is a 
group referred to by a label whose meaning is a 
matter of substantial collective agreement among 
the audiences who use it. Categorization is often 
considered as an instance of commensuration 
(Lounsbury and Rao, 2004, p.973). It presup-
poses comparison between particular elements in 
a form that makes equivalence possible (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005, p.320). Stable, shared mean-
ings are indeed essential to the process of estab-
lishing the terms of comparison and commen-
suration (Khaire and  Wadhwani, 2010, p.1283). 
By listing, classifying and grouping things within 
a category, commensurability is created, social 
comparisons are facilitated, and producers and 
consumers can make sense of the world (Anand 
and Peterson, 2000; DiMaggio, 1987; Lounsbury 
and Rao, 2004, p.974). Using the case study of 
law schools, Espeland and Sauder (2007) explain, 
for example, why rankings have permeated the 
legal education system, how they change percep-
tions, and how they “recreate social worlds”. This 
process requires significant resources and orga-
nization. Additionally, some instances of com-
mensuration actually help to constitute what they 
seek to measure. Grading systems, for example, 
create explicit categories of relative quality, and 
hence relative value, that open up the possibil-
ity of trade in products that may not yet exist 
(Cronon, 1991; Espeland and Stevens, 1998; 
Porter, 1996). Categorization is thus essential 
to commensuration and market construction. It 
provides “rules and understandings that are nec-
essary to make structured exchange possible in 
the first place” (Fligstein, 2001, p.32). As Loun-
sbury and Rao (2004, p.973) note, the very idea 
of markets depends on standardization and the 
comparability of the objects being exchanged 
(Douglas and Isherwood, 1979). Categorization 
supplies cognitive frameworks (DiMaggio, 1997) 
and defines boundaries (Khaire and Wadhwani, 
2010; Lamont, 2001; Lamont and Molnar, 2002). 
These frameworks and boundaries present or 
confirm a social order with specific meanings and 
legitimacy (Zelizer, 1988; Zhao, 2005, p.187). To 
sum up, categorization organizes information, 
generates shared understanding, affects valuation, 
and finally facilitates exchange in market settings 
(Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Khaire and Wadh-
wani, 2010). 
Sometimes categorization and value norms are 
redefined or reconstituted (Lounsbury and Rao, 
2004) and involve transformation of markets. 
Some scholars highlight that sophisticated forms 
of commensuration and categorization have 
truly transformed financial markets (Espeland 
and Stevens, 1998, p.325-6). Kennedy, Lo and 
Lounsbury (2010) argue for a vision of market 
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categories as the vocabulary for describing a con-
stantly-changing demand environment. 
Categorization and commensuration are not 
inevitable, however. As social processes (Des-
rosières, 1990, 1998), they require extensive effort 
to accomplish, since they integrate disparate value 
systems or different interests, reconfigure them 
and change the world in some way (Stevens and 
Espeland, 2004). As categorization involves not 
only “framing” (Callon and  Muniesa, 2005), that 
is, a definition of what a market transaction for-
mally includes, but also interplay between differ-
ent actors with potentially different worldviews 
(Huault and Rainelli, 2011), we argue that cat-
egorization is a contested political process. 
Categorization as a contested 
political process
Categorization is a mode of power; it is highly 
political (Lounsbury and Rao, 2004) as it recon-
structs relations of authority, creates new enti-
ties and establishes new interpretive frameworks 
(Espeland and Stevens, 1998, p.323). Selection of 
a particular category by social actors is a political 
action, being negotiated between interest groups, 
and the final categorization system is often 
the outcome of political battles between those 
groups (Zhao, 2005, p.191). Attempts by domi-
nant groups to manipulate the categories so as to 
maintain the existing order and consolidate their 
position highlight that categorization is shaped 
by the politics of markets (Fligstein, 1996; 2001) 
and driven by political dynamics. Lounsbury and 
Rao (2004) examine the role of industry media 
and powerful producers in category changes in 
the American mutual fund industry. They find 
that when powerful producers dominate a cat-
egory, they can counteract the influx of new 
entrants and encourage industry media to pre-
serve the existing structure of categories. Over-
all, dominant incumbents always strive to claim 
the desirable categories for themselves, in order 
to signal and consolidate their standing (Zhao, 
2005, p.188-191). They often take advantage of 
economic, political and cultural resources (Bour-
dieu, 1984) to control the categorization system. 
As Zhao (2005, p.193) illustrates, in the French 
wine industry, the categorization system embod-
ies the industry’s political power: the 1855 classi-
fication of Bordeaux wines was controlled by elite 
winemakers to protect their own interests and 
exclude other winemakers. 
Sometimes, actors show resistance to catego-
rization. We argue that when this resistance is 
built on arguments against the values underly-
ing the categorization, it can be analyzed using 
the concept of incommensurability developed by 
Espeland and Stevens (1998, p.332) and Zelizer 
(1985). This process of resistance requires work 
and draws boundaries around the things whose 
value is to be preserved. In his history of quan-
tification, Porter (1996) shows for example how 
Victorian actuaries, with their high regard for 
personal skills and experience, rejected the reg-
ulatory authorities’ push for “objectification”, on 
the grounds that their own expert judgment was 
superior.
The political nature of categorization (Loun-
sbury and Rao, 2004; Zhao, 2005) and the idea 
that categories are products of practical politi-
cal processes (Zuckerman, 1999) are now widely 
acknowledged in the literature. But few studies 
closely examine the process and resources used 
by actors to resist categorization. Building on the 
literature on cultural repertoires, we suggest that 
actors combine resources, namely values and jus-
tifications, to achieve their goals. We stress orga-
nizations’ political use of repertoires for resistance 
and argue that in the process of categorization, 
organizations select and use cultural resources 
drawn from the registers of their industries 
(Weber, 2005). 
Challenging industry registers to 
contest new categories
As Weber and Dacin (2011) underline, recent 
research work on cultural repertoires attributes 
greater agency to individuals and organizations 
that use cultural material as a pragmatic resource 
or toolkit. These toolkits can be defined as a set 
of symbols, stories, concepts, values and world-
views that actors can draw on to construct their 
action (Swidler, 1986). Embedded in a view that 
emphasizes agency in the use of culture (Weber 
and Dacin, 2011, p.289) with individuals acting 
as cultural entrepreneurs (Lounsbury and Glynn, 
2001) or bricoleurs (Rao et al., 2005), this con-
ception sees actors as using resources and mate-
rials for their own ends. Culture can thus be 
analyzed as a “combination of resources such as 
skills, goals, attitudes and theories, that can be 
variously recombined and differentially employed 
in different situations (…). It can also be open 
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to reinvention and the elements that constitute 
it can be recombined” (Leonardi, 2011, p.348).
Generally, organizations draw on the register of 
their own industry (Weber, 2005). As Rindova et 
al (2011) note, these registers consist of all con-
cepts produced by and available to members of 
a community to interpret situations and develop 
action strategies (Weber, 2005). They comprise 
a set of cultural resources that are understood 
and accepted as appropriate and relevant for the 
industry (Porac et al, 1989). Some research pays 
special attention to the process through which 
organizations can change or reshape the industry 
register, in conjunction with evolving economic, 
strategic and institutional contexts (e.g Oca-
sio and Joseph, 2005; Zilber, 2006). In doing so, 
these organizations also seek to influence the very 
categories they use for their self-definition (Rin-
dova et al., 2011, p.429; Zuckerman, 1999). Rin-
dova et al (2011) analyze the cultural resources 
incorporated by an organization into its reper-
toire and the related changes in its practices and 
strategies. They suggest that organizations change 
the categories they use in their self-definition in 
conjunction with their changing strategies, and 
that identity redefinition is a crucial mechanism 
enabling organizations to manage the “categori-
cal imperative” (Zuckerman, 1999). 
In this paper, we examine the way different mar-
ket participants distort their industry’s main cul-
tural repertoire to draw on values that will enable 
them to resist new developments, or promote 
solutions with the potential to significantly alter 
the definition and nature of the markets in which 
they compete. Our emphasis will be on the use 
of values within controversies (Leonardi, 2011), 
and the industry register of the actors involved. 
Building on the literature related to cultural 
repertoires and categorization, we analyse the 
way dominant organizations combine different 
resources, namely values and concepts, for their 
own ends (Weber and Dacin, 2011). We also 
highlight the political use of repertoires (Kellogg, 
2011) for resistance by organizations seeking to 
reconceptualize the market itself. We examine 
the way actors change their cultural repertoire 
to challenge a certain conception of the market. 
Overall, this study addresses three main research 
questions: What resources do actors use to con-
test categorization and a certain definition of the 
market? What is the role of industry registers in 
the contestation process? How do actors draw on 
values and cultural resources to attain their goal?
Methodology
Empirical setting
The setting of our study is OTC markets, in the 
light of proposed regulatory change. Under pres-
sure from politicians and negative public opinion 
in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, regula-
tors and public authorities in developed countries 
have taken spectacular though as yet only prelimi-
nary steps towards regulation of OTC derivatives 
markets. The growing dependence of the whole 
financial sphere on OTC markets had gone 
unnoticed for years until the subprime crash sud-
denly turned the spotlight on this form of mar-
ket, which had been quietly gaining dominance 
in modern finance (Huault and Rainelli, 2013). 
Among the most obvious issues revealed by the 
crisis, lack of knowledge of basic OTC market 
features such as their actual size, the exact num-
ber and nature of players, the number of transac-
tions involved, the prices quoted, or the liquidity 
of the products traded came to be acknowledged 
along with the urgent need for improvement. 
This may explain why, in a collective move, 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have 
adopted an approach favouring displacement of 
as many OTC transactions as possible to orga-
nized markets. The September 2009 G20 summit 
explicitly stated the following: “All standardized 
OTC derivative contracts should be traded on 
exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where 
appropriate, and cleared through central counter-
parties by end-2012 at the latest.”  Seen as a means 
“to tackle less regulated or more opaque parts of 
the financial system and to improve the organi-
zation, transparency and oversight of all market 
segments”1, the philosophy of the coming regu-
lations is to be implemented through the Dodd 
Frank Act in the US, which is still in the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
consultation process. In Europe, the project has 
been developed mostly through MiFID II, the 
revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive, also currently under European Com-
mission consultation2. The aim is to ensure that 
1. MiFID Public consultation document 2011
2. Appendix 1 provides an overview of the decision-making 
process in the European Union. Appendix 2 contains extracts 
from the Directive, its main objectives and relevant sec-
tions of the text regarding transparency and OTC markets.
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“where appropriate, trading in standardized OTC 
derivatives moves to exchanges or electronic plat-
forms”, which, “at a minimum, would imply that 
trading on exchanges and electronic platforms 
becomes the norm when the market in a given 
derivative is suitably developed3”. 
The change intended by regulators is huge due 
to the size of OTC markets. The total notional 
amounts outstanding4 of OTC derivatives stood 
at $708 trillion at the end of June 2011. Experts 
from TABB Group5 suggest that “as much as 
$40 billion of annual revenues (excluding credit 
derivatives) [are] at stake in global OTC deriva-
tives for the 20 largest broker dealers” and point 
out that the likely result of the proposed reform 
is a risk of compressed margins, and consequently 
threatened profitability for major players. Unsur-
prisingly, the industry’s reaction has been to resist 
the regulatory projects; through multi-channel 
efforts, the incumbent players are seeking to 
hamper changes in the status quo as far as pos-
sible. A report published in 2011 by the TabbFo-
rum6 states that 68% of dealers involved in OTC 
markets declare they are lobbying against the 
proposed OTC regulatory reform.
The consultations organized on both sides of the 
Atlantic provide relevant, publicly accessible data 
on the justifications large financial institutions 
put forward for pursuing this goal. In this paper, 
we propose to use this material to gain insight 
into the kind of discourse and resources needed 
for a powerful industry to maintain control over 
its environment when threatened by outsider-
driven regulatory projects. Our main focus is on 
the use of cultural repertoires, values and cat-
egories in this battle, and the role they play in 
enabling the financial industry to counter criti-
cism from regulatory bodies.
The research is based on a qualitative case study, 
which is appropriate for many reasons (Green-
wood and Suddaby 2006, p.31). First, the process 
3. MiFID Public consultation document 2011.
4. Bank of International Settlements Statistics, 2011.
5. Founded in 2003, TABB Group is a financial market 
research and strategic advisory firm focused on capital mar-
kets. Its goal is to help “financial actors to gain an understan-
ding of financial markets issues and trends”. Their services 
are offered through research, consulting and the TABBFo-
rum. It frequently publishes commentaries on current events 
in the industry. 
6. European Credit and Rates Dealers 2011- Capital, Clea-
ring and Central Limit Order Books, Tabbgroup.
observed in these markets constitutes a com-
plex social setting in which causal dynamics are 
not immediately apparent. Second, the object of 
analysis involves processes which are best studied 
through the use of inductive techniques. Contex-
tualization and dynamic structuring of the world-
views of the people under study (Maguire, Law-
rence and Hardy 2004; Lee 1999, p.43) are thus 
of critical importance. We also chose this case 
because it provided several benefits as a “theo-
retical sample” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; 
Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010). The time period 
covered includes a regulatory change which can 
be analyzed as an attempt to change the way OTC 
markets are categorized. This made it possible to 
analyze how the markets’ main actors, particularly 
big banks, make sense of regulators’ categoriza-
tion and how they accept or reject it. Our case 
is also a good illustration of the use of cultural 
repertoires in resistance to change, as embodied 
in the disputes over categories, specifically con-
cerning the definitions of products and markets. 
Finally, the case studied is particularly appropri-
ate because due to the recent crisis and various 
public initiatives, banks, experts, regulators, and 
the media have no hesitation in expressing them-
selves, and a large number of texts contain their 
views and arguments on the contributions and 
limitations of future developments.
Data sources
Our first objective is to offer a description of 
OTC markets and their recent developments in 
order to improve understanding of our subject. 
We then attempt to put forward the views and 
types of arguments that agents use. To achieve 
these objectives, we used several sources of empir-
ical evidence, mainly textual sources, which can 
be divided into three main categories.
Archive materials. We consulted many types of 
official documents published by national and 
transnational organizations, such as the stud-
ies by the Bank of International Settlements 
and the International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions (IOSCO), an association of 
organizations that regulate the world’s securi-
ties and futures markets. We also tracked down 
reports and white papers issued by consultants 
and think tanks, to better understand the OTC 
market context, confirm the main recent events 
in those markets, and have textual accounts of 
debates and discussions. We studied information, 
Is transparency a value on OTC markets? 10/27
Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France
http://www.fmsh.fr - FMSH-WP-2014-55
texts, industry publications, and discourses from 
major actors’ websites such as the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) or 
TABB Group’s TabbForum, all concerning the 
introduction of new rules. TabbForum is a dis-
cussion forum for the financial industry, where 
major financial actors publish their ideas about 
what is happening in the marketplace, and their 
opinions about the impact of new events, such as 
regulation, on the industry. It is a relevant source 
of data for this study, since it reflects major finan-
cial actors’ main discourses and justifications. 
MiFID consultation. We analyzed contributions 
to the public consultation organized by the Euro-
pean Commission in a document concerning 
the review of the Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive (MiFID) from 08/12/2010 to 
02/02/2011. The consultation’s purpose was “to 
consult market participants, regulators and other 
stakeholders on possible changes to the regula-
tory framework established by MiFID in the 
field of investment services and activities as well 
as markets in financial instruments”. It invited 
responses to “provide important guidance for 
preparing a formal Commission proposal”. Of 
the 282 publicly available responses to the con-
sultation paper, the 279 that provided all the 
information needed for this study were carefully 
analyzed in order to understand how resistance 
to change is justified by respondents, what argu-
ments are used and with what expected effect 
on the regulator. Not surprisingly, the responses 
devote considerable amounts of space to the issue 
of the electronic venues or platforms on which 
OTC derivatives would be exchanged once the 
regulation is adopted, and the associated trans-
parency requirements. This is a central issue since 
it concerns the degree of both pre- and post-trade 
transparency to be imposed on so far opaquely 
trading OTC markets.
Table I gives a summary description of the con-
tributions to the MiFID Consultation.
These materials provided textual accounts of 
debates and discussions.  Close analysis of the 
responses provides interesting results, particularly 
as regards the main investment banks’ generally 
hostile attitude to the proposed regulation and 
the means they use to resist unwelcome change. 
As these large financial institutions are at the 
core of OTC markets and are involved in most of 
the deals struck on those markets, the consulta-
tion responses provide a rich database to observe 
resistance to the new regulations, and to study the 
discourses, justifications and values used for that 
purpose.
Finally, informal discussions with an ISDA mem-
ber and a MEP’s assistant helped us understand 
their respective views of progress in the MiFID 
legislative process. 
Press articles. To review press articles, we used the 
Factiva database that contains business news col-
lected from 14,000 international media sources. 
A total of 150 articles from the years 2008 to 
2011 were selected for our database, beginning 
with searches using the terms “OTC markets” 
Registered  
organization or 
Individuala
Public Authority Total
Total number of responses 137 22 279
Average number of pages 15.7 pages 19 pages 16 pages
Standard deviation 18 15.7 17.82
Average percentage of the response 
devoted to either venues/platforms  or 
transparency requirements for OTC 
products (words)b
7.13% 9.84% 7.35%
Standard deviation 0.052 0.076 0.113
a. Although participants in the consultation could register 
as organizations or individuals, all the entities registered as 
individuals are in fact organizations. As banks and associa-
tions are thus included in both categories, all the statistics 
presented here are based on the total for both.
b. Number of words devoted to questions 8 to 12 or 37 to 42 
of the consultation, divided by the total number of words of 
the response. For the precise wording of consultation ques-
tions see Appendix 4.
Table I. Responses to the 2011 MiFID Consultation Paper
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and “regulation”. These documents enabled us 
not only to retrace the main events (see appendix 
3), but also to focus on the representations and 
discourses of major investment banks and regu-
lators, regarding OTC markets and recent devel-
opments regarding their regulation.
Data analysis
Our analysis was conducted in several stages. 
Taking the press articles as our basis, we first 
arranged the data in order to identify the main 
actors and events in OTC markets from 2008 to 
2011. We then set out to capture the “justificatory 
accounts” of the various actors (Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006; Huault and Rainelli, 2009, 2011) 
involved in OTC markets and their evolution. 
We focused on an initial set of narratives from 
the MiFID consultation, subsequent ISDA com-
ments on MiFID and articles published on the 
TabbForum, reviewing them carefully and using 
content analysis to bring out two main fronts in 
the banks’ resistance to any change: 1/ debates 
about the virtues of transparency, 2/debates about 
the nature of the market. We then used the other 
data sources to verify these recurring themes. In 
a final stage, we account for these justifications in 
terms of cultural toolkits, and contrast the indus-
try register used to fight regulatory change with 
the register usually mobilized in the financial 
field. 
Case study
OTC markets: Challenging the 
virtues of transparency
The main front opened by the proposed regu-
lation regards the kind of electronic venues on 
which OTC products should be traded once the 
reform is adopted. Since the adoption of MiFID 
I in Europe, financial instruments can be traded 
either on traditional stock exchanges, called Reg-
ulated Markets (RMs), or on electronic platforms 
called multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), 
which since 2007 have taken significant mar-
ket share from the traditional stock exchanges. 
MTFs allow eligible contract participants to 
trade a variety of securities via electronic systems 
operated by market operators or large investment 
firms. As well as an obligation to establish “trans-
parent and non discretionary rules for fair and 
orderly trading7”, MTFs must meet pre-trade and 
7. MiFID I, art 14.
post-trade transparency requirements. In particu-
lar, they must disclose current bid and ask prices 
and the depth of trading interest at those prices, 
except for orders of a specific size or type; this 
places them under the same kind of obligation 
as any regulated market, “except where justified 
by the specific nature of the MTF”. As regards 
post-trade transparency, MTFs must disclose 
the price, volume and time of the transactions 
executed through their systems, with possible 
exemptions that must be duly justified. Requir-
ing OTC derivatives trading to move to elec-
tronic platforms raises the question of whether 
the MTF “regime”, with its post-trade and espe-
cially pre-trade transparency obligations, is suited 
to the kind of products usually traded OTC. 
Transparency as a contested value for 
OTC markets
As regards the venues on which so-far OTC con-
tracts should be traded in the future, the regula-
tors wish to create specific platforms, called SEFs 
(Swap Execution Facilities) in the proposed US 
reform, and OTFs (Organized Trading Facili-
ties) in the European Commission Proposal. The 
debate then focuses on the transparency require-
ments applicable to these facilities. Post-trade 
transparency at first entailed limited debate - no 
one seemed to expect OTC markets to be able to 
escape that obligation in the long run, although 
the debate reignited later. But pre-trade transpar-
ency became the “hot topic”. The MiFID pro-
posal is that each venue “would be required to 
make its quote both in terms of price and vol-
ume available to the public”, suggesting that the 
OTF regime is not meant to be significantly dif-
ferent from the MTF regime in terms of trans-
parency obligations. Amendments seem possible, 
however. The Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
(AMF-– France’s equivalent of the SEC), for 
example, suggests a distinction between a sort of 
“supra-OTF regime”, for which  
“requirements (governance/organization, mul-
tilaterality, pre-trade transparency etc.) should 
be very demanding, and “regular” OTFs, pri-
marily aimed at trading in less liquid financial 
instruments”. 
In a long, detailed report, the IOSCO concludes 
that both more structured and less structured 
platforms are necessary, according to the liquidity 
of the derivatives targeted. Opponents to over-
stringent regulation, meanwhile, plead for as 
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much flexibility as possible in the electronic trad-
ing facilities. According to the January 2010 Tabb 
report, the legislative proposal to move OTC 
markets to multilateral trading venues met with 
“more resistance from the major dealer com-
munity, than any of the other (financial regula-
tion) proposals”, (Tabb Report, January 2010),
a situation the report’s authors explain by  
“the resistance to adopting any mechanism 
that attempts to pierce the veil of opaque pri-
cing currently enjoyed by major dealers” (Tabb 
Report, January 2010).
This is reflected in the ISDA’s insistence that the 
OTF regime must protect the existing diversity 
of models for negotiating and executing deriva-
tives trading. It warns that 
“if the OTF regime is inflexible in design 
and/or promoted too aggressively for pro-
ducts currently traded OTC”, (ISDA-MiFID 
consultation)
 - meaning, if the OTF regime requires stringent 
pre-trade transparency - then the market would
“concentrate into a narrower range of pro-
ducts, hampering market participants to ma-
nage risks appropriately and conducing to loss 
of market efficiency.”
The ISDA is joined in this position by the whole 
industry, various representatives of which devote 
a significant portion of their response to the con-
sultation to this issue, as the following quotations 
illustrate:
“The pre-trade transparency requirements 
may play against the market” (ABBL- As-
sociation of Bankers Luxembourg- MiFID 
Consultation)
“It is considered that trade transparency is not 
necessary for structured financial instruments 
as proposed by the European Commission” 
(ABI- Association of Italian Bankers- MiFID 
consultation)
“The public transparency criteria associated 
with organized venues could prove problema-
tic for market participants” (British Bankers 
Association (BBA) - MiFID consultation)
“Pre-trade price transparency is hard to 
force” (British Bankers Association- MiFID 
consultation) 
“The EBF opposes the introduction of a pre-
trade transparency regime for instruments 
that are traded OTC” (European Banking Fe-
deration- MiFID Consultation)
The very principle of the legislative proposal 
requiring investment firms executing OTC trades 
to provide “quotes to a large number of investors 
at a price close to market value from comparable 
instruments traded on organized venues” is con-
tested by some:
“In general terms transparency in markets can 
help to build confidence, by ensuring that par-
ticipants have access to information. However, 
there are products and markets, which are so 
illiquid, that revealing trade information could 
actually be detrimental to buyers and sellers. 
We have to balance the benefits of transpa-
rency versus the potential downsides”. (Citi- 
MiFID consultation)
Recent posts on the TabbForum have also argued 
that the “regulators’ aggressive push for near-
total transparency” carries with it a “heavy burden 
of unintended consequences”. Larry Tabb, the 
founder of TABB group, writes for example that 
it will shift the market toward an agency model 
where the banks themselves do not hold inven-
tories of products for clients. And as banks bear 
less risk, more risk will be shifted to investors and 
issuers. Another contributor to the TabbForum, 
Andy Nybo8, expresses his views very directly: 
“Let’s also admit that capital markets must 
operate, to some degree, like a casino where 
risks are taken, firms go bust from time to 
time and investors must protect themselves 
via title to their investments and by avoiding 
over-concentration of brokerage relationships. 
If we try too hard to protect all the partici-
pants from each other, especially during the 
trading process, end investors will have to pay 
the heavy insurance premiums that this pro-
tection requires”.
The proposed legislation is also depicted as irrele-
vant given the specificities of the products traded 
on OTC markets. The ISDA for example con-
tests the term “quote”, at least for the more struc-
tured (in other words less standardized) products, 
and proposes that the price of OTC derivatives 
should be seen as a price for a 
8. Principal and Head of TABB’s Derivatives practice, 24 
April 2012.
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“solution” 
which can 
“take weeks, if not months to finalize”. 
Highly bespoke products have 
“by definition no benchmark price” 
and apparently identical products 
might differ in price according to the 
“perceived creditworthiness of the counterparty”: 
“A price will always reflect the situation at the 
time it is made and therefore will not necessa-
rily be comparable”.  
Overall, the financial industry’s defence against 
pre-trade transparency obligations for would-be 
OTC markets consists in demanding maximum 
flexibility for the regimes governing venues on 
which OTC derivatives will be traded. As the aim 
is to preserve opacity on some segments of these 
markets while fostering greater transparency on 
the segments where it already exists, the propos-
als from the consultation generate a proliferation 
of acronyms (MTF, SEF, OTF), regimes (see e.g. 
the AMF notion of a supra and regular regime 
for OTFs) and product definitions (structured to 
different degrees along various dimensions, with 
special focus on pre-trade transparency require-
ments), reflecting the demand for flexibility from 
an industry trying to escape mandatory require-
ments as far as possible.
Transparency in the cultural repertoire of 
the financial industry
As we have seen, the regulators’ move to turning 
OTC markets into organized markets originated 
in discovery of the drawbacks of OTC derivative 
opacity in times of financial crisis. More implic-
itly, it also builds on the usual cultural repertoire 
of finance, the financial theory of efficient mar-
kets, which since the early work of Louis Bach-
elier in 1900 has provided the paradigmatic 
framework for financial models’ theorization 
and financial innovation. Transparency enjoys 
the positive status of a virtue in this paradigm, 
since it is a prerequisite for market efficiency. In 
short, transparent markets are presumed to pro-
vide free and equally accessible information to all 
investors, allowing them to trade in fair condi-
tions. Transparency thus fosters liquidity, with a 
large number of investors willing to enter into a 
large number of transactions, and market com-
petition ensures that privately held information 
is rapidly translated into prices via the actions of 
actors buying or selling on the basis of this infor-
mation. This is how markets attain informational 
efficiency (prices reflect all available information 
at any time), which transforms into general effi-
ciency (markets provide economic agents with 
trustworthy signals on the economic fundamen-
tals). Non-transparent markets, in contrast, nur-
ture information asymmetries which destroy trust 
in the fairness of transactions and tend to threaten 
the market’s very existence (Akerlof, 1970) by 
discouraging market participation. In identify-
ing the opacity of OTC derivatives markets as a 
flaw warranting remedy, the regulators are in line 
with the classic financial theory paradigm, which 
derives from a view of ideal financial markets 
largely inspired by the Walrasian auction market 
model. This paradigm has been taught all over the 
world over the last fifty years and provides the 
theoretical basis for most financial industry prac-
tices. As a result, arguing against transparency to 
fight unwelcome regulatory change is an uncom-
fortable stance for the industry. It involves dem-
onstrating that transparency is not always a virtue 
and can in fact, in contradiction to the usual cul-
tural repertoire, have negative effects on market 
efficiency. While respondents to the consultation 
have no hesitation in making this assertion, they 
find themselves short of theoretical resources to 
back up their opinion. The observed tactic for 
escaping this difficulty is to invoke the specific 
nature of OTC markets. A good deal of such 
arguments consist in emphasizing the difference 
between OTC markets and more ‘traditional 
markets’ or stock exchanges, in order to convey 
the idea that the standard theory is inappropriate 
and regulators are wrong to try to force ill-suited 
mandatory requirements on markets that are dif-
ferent in nature.
The argument of the specific 
nature of OTC markets
The issue of market nature
The typical attitude of major investment banks 
towards the proposed regulation of OTC deriv-
atives markets is systematic resistance against 
change to the status quo, and accordingly their 
response to the MiFID II consultation docu-
ment not only explicitly covers technical matters 
but also questions the relevance of the reform’s 
general goal. In opposition to regulators such as 
the SEC Chairman who would like derivatives 
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rules to reflect the virtues of the current equities 
market, i.e competition, wide access, liquidity and 
transparency9, the banks repeatedly contend that 
OTC markets belong to a different species of 
market, and obey a qualitatively and structurally 
different logic. 
“We are concerned that the approach pro-
posed does not fully take into account the na-
ture of the OTC derivatives market. We feel it 
is essential to understand that execution me-
chanisms for OTC products must be appro-
priate” (Deutsche Bank-MiFID consultation).
“We support the development of a formal 
regulatory regime, as long as it is sensitive 
to the nature of the market” (ISDA-MiFID 
Consultation)
“There have not been, to the best of our 
knowledge, any serious academic studies de-
monstrating that the transposition of the 
equity model to OTC derivative products will 
be economically more efficient than the cur-
rent trading model” (BNP-Paribas- MiFID 
consultation)
Failure to recognize the “specific nature” of OTC 
markets, the industry argues, results in regulators’ 
overlooking the fact that on OTC markets, trans-
parency is likely to impair rather than improve 
liquidity. Concurring with a view expressed in the 
press before the MiFID consultation, 
“By moving OTC products onto exchanges, 
we would expect to see a reduction in liqui-
dity that may negatively impact the sought-
after price transparency,” (Bruce Collins, de-
puty chairman of Tradition, an interdealer 
broker based in London) (Source: Dow Jones 
Newswires, 14-5-2009)
respondents to the consultation express concerns 
over the impact of transparency requirements on 
market liquidity:
“Too much transparency will create cost, 
noise and, as discussed, could have a negative 
impact on market liquidity, in particular for 
large OTC trades” (Deutsche Bank- MiFID 
Consultation)
“Transparency requirements can result in de-
creases in order/transaction size and increased 
trade frequency.  These can be signs of an inef-
ficient market, as they can be the result of the 
9. Source: Financial Times; 23.9.2010
unwillingness of market participants to per-
form effective risk transfer functions” (BBA –
MiFID consultation)
The general idea is that requiring too much trans-
parency on OTC markets would in fact reduce 
incentives to trade OTC products for both buyers 
and sellers, with a knock-on decrease in liquid-
ity on the markets and consequently a loss of 
efficiency:
“Mandatory trading on exchanges without 
the appropriate flexibility and exemptions 
could lead to a reduction in competition, a 
lack of innovation to meet end-user needs, a 
drying up of liquidity during periods of mar-
ket stress, a reduction in market efficiency 
and an increase in costs as end users have to 
execute a larger number of smaller trades to 
avoid adverse price movements” (BBA-Mi-
FID Consultation)
“Enforced transparency requirements could 
have a detrimental impact on liquidity and 
potentially the availability of the products to 
investors as banks would be reticent to trade” 
(BBA-MiFID)
The idea that on OTC markets, lack of trans-
parency, not to say opacity, provides the neces-
sary incentive to compete, innovate and trade not 
only runs against the traditional industry register 
– the classical paradigm of financial theory - but 
also sketches out an unorthodox mechanism for 
which no systematic theorization is proposed in 
the consultation responses and no empirical proof 
is provided. The consultation responses basically 
agree that given their “specific nature”, OTC 
markets have more to lose than gain from more 
stringent transparency requirements, but vary in 
their explanations of why this should be so. Some 
insist that the bespoke nature of OTC-traded 
products makes bilateral transactions necessary:
“It is also important to understand that the 
main use of the OTC FX market is to allow 
corporates to hedge future exposures. They 
therefore require an ability to trade against 
specific dates or to cover specific, changing 
circumstances. Because of the bespoke nature 
of these transactions it is crucial that the dea-
ler market retains the ability to trade with each 
other in a bespoke manner. Failure to do this 
will lead to significant risk mismatch and large 
PandL swings”. (BBA- MiFID Consultation)
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Larry Tabb also states on the TabbForum that 
although shifting OTC derivatives to Swap Exe-
cution Facilities should increase the turnover of 
fairly illiquid products, it will reduce the customi-
zability of these products. 
As bilateral trading contradicts the notion of a 
publicly quoted price based on aggregation of 
supply and demand (reflected in the name MTF, 
for Multilateral Trading Facilities), this argument 
indirectly yet forcefully contests the inherent vir-
tuousness of transparency in exchange trading. 
Others emphasize the current illiquidity of some 
OTC markets and claim that transparency is not 
welcome on illiquid markets, again for various 
reasons:
“When an instrument becomes illiquid, 
it should be allowed to trade OTC to en-
sure continued markets in that instrument.” 
(BBA-MiFID Consultation)
“Indeed it could include a vast number of illi-
quid fixed income instruments, and also secu-
rities that may have been targeted as a bes-
poke transaction or not intended to be freely 
traded in the market, in relation to which en-
forced transparency requirements could have 
a detrimental impact on liquidity and poten-
tially the availability of the products to inves-
tors as banks would be reticent to trade them.” 
(BBA-MiFID Consultation)
“The introduction of a prescriptive pre-trade 
transparency regime could well undermine the 
functioning of OTC derivative markets, given 
that there would be a disincentive for liqui-
dity providers to publish prices, particularly 
on more illiquid products” (ISDA-MiFID 
consultation)
“Moreover, the products themselves can be 
quite illiquid, even those considered more va-
nilla (eg rates options). Disclosure of the tran-
saction to the market could harm clients since 
the market would immediately be able to as-
certain the client position and move against it, 
while at the same time likely breaching client 
confidentiality” (ISDA-MiFID Consultation)
The specific nature of OTC markets is also 
invoked to assert that besides being potentially 
harmful, reforming transparency requirements 
is useless because market players are not retail 
investors but professionals or “specialists”, and for 
such specialist operators transparency issues do 
not take the same form as on Walrasian markets.
Markets for specialists
According to many respondents to the consulta-
tion, one key feature of OTC markets is that they 
are of a 
“professional nature (exchanges often have a 
significant retail level of participation)” (BBA-
MiFID consultation).
Accordingly, transparency requirements intended 
to protect retail investors on organized markets 
make much less sense on OTC markets, where 
they can actually be detrimental:
“We would contend that the proposition that 
what works in the equity market, where re-
tail participation is significant, must work (or 
must be able to work) in the non-equity mar-
kets, which are predominantly wholesale in 
nature, is flawed” (Icap-MiFID Consultation)
“Finally, one should keep in mind that the 
more transparent the markets, the more diffi-
cult it would be to limit their access to all sorts 
of investors. It may not be wise to let retail in-
vestors feel as if it would be good for them to 
invest in derivative instruments because they 
are traded on an exchange (or trading plat-
form)” (ABBL Bankers Luxembourg- MiFID 
consultation)
Certain respondents even consider such require-
ments useless, as professionals, institutions and 
specialists have the resources to access relevant 
information.
“Market participants are principally institu-
tional and professional in nature and are able 
to access pre-trade transparency through mul-
tiple venues and formats. As a result, end users 
typically have more data than market makers” 
(BBA-MiFID Consultation)
“OTC derivatives are a wholesale, inter-pro-
fessional market and all interested parties have 
ready access to the information they require” 
(BBA-MiFID Consultation)
Overall, analysis of the industry responses to the 
MiFID consultation evidences strong resistance 
to change, sometimes expressed bluntly, present-
ing OTC markets as part of a “brave new world”:
“There are many reasons why clients pre-
fer to trade derivatives OTC in certain 
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circumstances, including pricing, confidentia-
lity and operational ease. We do not believe 
that reducing this consumer choice will repre-
sent a positive development for the market.”
“The wide range of sources currently available 
has emerged specifically as a response to the 
diverse and idiosyncratic nature of the OTC 
markets” (BBA-MiFID consultation)
As the proposed reform draws its main argu-
ments from the classic paradigm of modern 
finance, financial institutions fighting manda-
tory transparency requirements find themselves 
cornered into a position where, having asserted 
that there is no need for more transparency on 
OTC markets, they have no legitimate cultural 
repertoire to back up their position. To get out 
of this corner, they refer to the specific nature of 
OTC markets, asserting that the mechanisms 
linking transparency, liquidity and efficiency on 
those markets differ from the theory applicable 
to Walrasian markets. In the empirical material 
we study, the specificities of OTC markets are 
described in many different ways, but no consis-
tent theory is proposed as regards the distinctive 
features of “specialist” markets and the mecha-
nisms needed for them to function satisfactorily. 
The specificity argument is mostly put forward 
in order to emphasize the irrelevance of the pro-
posed reform; this is ultimately clearly reflected 
in the battle over the categories proposed by the 
regulator.
Contesting the relevance of the standard 
categories
The principle of the MiFID II proposal is that 
once it is adopted, all “eligible” OTC derivatives 
should move to organized platforms and be clea-
red through a clearing house. This should take 
place, “where appropriate”, “when a market in a 
market derivative is suitably developed”, and it 
should concern all “standardized OTC deriva-
tives”. As all these expressions require further 
definitions, the major industry players devote sig-
nificant amounts of space in their consultation 
responses to contesting the definitions and cat-
egories proposed by the regulators.
The ISDA, for example, discusses at some length 
the difficulty of defining which OTC products 
would be “suitable”, or “eligible” for specific pieces 
of regulation. First, the ISDA advocates, 
“The  ssessment of whether a derivative is sui-
table for  trading  on  a  particular trading ve-
nue should be made separately to the assess-
ment of its eligibility for central clearing”.
As regards trading on a venue, it seems that 
contrary to the regulator’s assertion, product 
standardization would not provide a clear-cut 
criterion:
“It  is  not  always  appropriate  for  deriva-
tives  trading  to  take place on organized  tra-
ding platforms even  if transactions have 
been become relatively standardized 
in some respects”.
Furthermore, 
 “A contract might exhibit the necessary stan-
dardization for clearing, but nonetheless be 
unsuitable for trading on a particular venue, 
whether Regulated Market, MTF or OTF.”
Liquidity is not considered any better as a crite-
rion, because 
“derivatives trade far less frequently than secu-
rities, such that many products will not be sui-
table for trading on a particular venue”.   
Moreover “a liquidity criterion  would  be  dif-
ficult  to  administer  in  practice” and the ISDA 
warns regulators that if they stick to the idea of 
including a liquidity threshold in the assessment 
of whether a product should be traded on a venue, 
the exercise would be fraught with difficulties. It 
insists the threshold should be: 
“set at a realistic level that differentiates 
between products, capable of being calculated 
and predicted, subject to periodic review and 
able to accommodate temporary changes in 
the market”. 
The argument that complexity is an equally irrele-
vant benchmark for defining categories is empha-
sized several times in the ISDA, BBA and other 
investment banks’ responses: 
“a false link is sometimes made between pro-
duct complexity and product risk, which leads 
to the illusion that complex instruments are 
automatically high-risk instruments”. 
The same example, described at length in many 
banks’ responses, is intended to demonstrate how 
product complexity in OTC derivatives markets 
often results from products being designed to 
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reduce risks for the customer, which means there 
is no call for specific risk protection. 
Overall, the arguments developed seek to under-
mine the categorization proposed in the legisla-
tion by depicting it as irrelevant and/or impos-
sible to implement in practice given the specific 
nature of OTC markets. The various criteria of 
levels of standardization, liquidity or complexity 
are presented as inoperational, creating a sense 
that the regulators’ proposed categorization, 
which follows the classic paradigm of finance 
theory, does not fit OTC products. Suggesting a 
redrafting of article 7 of the MiFID, the ISDA10 
tellingly proposes:
“removing the references to ‘depth of trading 
interests’ and ‘on a continuous basis’ or qua-
lifying both by inserting the phrase ‘where 
appropriate’. This would enable an OTF ope-
rator to determine the appropriate pre-trade 
information to be made available to clients, 
based on the needs of those clients.”
To summarize, the empirical material gath-
ered from the publicly available responses to the 
MiFID consultation provides evidence of the 
justificatory resources a powerful industry uses 
to resist unwanted regulatory change. The major 
players of the field come out against the regulators 
and their position backed by the classic paradigm 
of financial theory, predicting dire consequences 
if the regulation is implemented. They support 
their view by reference to the specific nature of 
OTC markets, for which they argue neither the 
standard theory nor the standard categories apply. 
Our evidence shows how the battle over regula-
tion requires  interest groups, to be capable of 
using selected items of cultural material to award 
or deny legitimacy to the concepts used for cat-
egorization or assigning value. More fundamen-
tally, we evidence the way the financial industry 
attempts to resist regulatory change by creating 
incommensurability. OTC markets, they assert 
rather than demonstrate, cannot be considered 
with the standard categories and concepts, and 
must be understood as incommensurable to more 
traditional financial markets. They have their 
own irreducible identity, as markets for special-
ists that emerge naturally in response to demand 
from market players, and must not therefore be 
distorted by unwanted regulation. Interestingly 
10. February 15, 2012 , ISDA paper: MiFID/MiFIR and 
Transparency for OTC Derivatives.
enough, despite the number and length of the 
documents gathered in response to the MiFID 
consultation, we observe no consistent argument 
on the definition of the market for specialists. 
We find a great variety of arguments converging 
towards the notion that regulation is inappropri-
ate, but with very little discussion of the general 
mechanisms driving the operation of OTC mar-
kets. Attempts at theorization on the desirabil-
ity of letting OTC markets function as currently, 
although developed elsewhere in its documenta-
tion, are almost totally absent from the ISDA’s 
lobbying efforts against MiFID. The traditional 
industry register is rejected, but no alternative is 
proposed.
Discussion
This paper seeks to build on recent work focus-
ing on the socio-political origin of categorization, 
and how it involves political struggles. In particu-
lar, we examine the process by which attempts at 
categorizing are contested. To gain insight into 
this question, we analyze the way incumbents 
draw on cultural resources and use or challenge 
their industry register to resist moves to change 
the nature of the markets in which they operate. 
First, our case study highlights the political nature 
of categorization, an issue that echoes the work 
of Lounsbury and Rao (2004) and Zhao (2005), 
among others. We depict the attempts at resisting 
a new category as a way for incumbents to retain 
their situation. We agree with Lounsbury and 
Rao (2004) that existing categorization is shaped 
by the interplay of interests, and that powerful 
actors tend to counteract new categorization and 
attempt to preserve the status quo (which favours 
them). Categorization thus appears as implicated 
in a system of power (Fligstein, 2001) where 
incumbents strive to control the categorization 
system and definition of desirable or undesirable 
categories, in order to consolidate their position 
(Zhao, 2005). 
Additionally, our results focus on the processes by 
which actors resist categorization. Using the lit-
erature related to cultural repertoires, and more 
specifically industry registers, we show that actors 
draw on values and justifications to achieve their 
goals. We stress the political use of repertoires for 
resistance by organizations interested in contest-
ing categories and shaping the market. Our case 
study confirms that resistance to the new cate-
gorization relies mainly on asserting the specific 
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nature of OTC markets, and disputing the rel-
evance of the financial sphere’s traditional indus-
try register to those markets. We specifically 
analyze the argumentation apparatus developed 
by regulation opponents as an attempt to create 
incommensurability. This allows us to build on 
Espeland and Stevens’ view (1998) that incom-
mensurability can be used to make comparisons 
and standardization impossible. Other scholars 
have observed this process in several contexts (e.g 
Espeland, 1998; Huault and Rainelli, 2011; Por-
ter, 1996, Zelizer, 1985) and have analyzed the 
resistance sometimes encountered by attempts 
at commensuration. For example, land was con-
sidered incommensurable by the Yavapaï people 
whose territory was threatened by a proposed 
dam (Espeland, 1998). The way bureaucrats rep-
resented Yavapaï interests in a rational decision 
model expressing the market value of the land 
was at odds with the core values of the Yavapaï. 
This study highlights the importance of forms 
of value and shows that efforts to impose a cat-
egorization can “revitalize the salience of incom-
mensurable categories” (Espeland, 1998: 210). 
Similarly, Huault and Rainelli (2011) analyze 
the attempts of financial actors to create a new 
market for weather derivatives, examining how 
they try to impose their metric on other spheres 
of economic action that did not originally share 
it. They highlight the different value systems at 
stake, each rooted in a different worldview, ulti-
mately showing that different metrics continue to 
co-exist on the market. In both cases, the notion 
of “incommensurability” relates to the conflict 
between different modes of valuing (Beunza and 
Stark, 2004, p. 373) and the confrontation of dif-
ferent paradigms (Kaplan and Murray, 2010). 
However, what we observe in this empirical study 
is an industry innovatively creating incommen-
surability with its own standard industry register. 
Moreover, while financial actors resist the new 
categorization by contesting the traditional val-
ues of the financial field, they do not put forward 
any alternative cultural repertoire. Categorization 
is resisted, but with no consistent reference to 
another value system or industry register.
The main contribution of this research is its focus 
on the way powerful actors in a field resist cat-
egorization. While the literature on commen-
suration has devoted much space to analysis of 
incommensurability as a means of resistance for 
weakly-positioned actors in a field, we observe 
how powerful actors facing unwanted regulation 
also have to fight categorization to resist threat-
ening changes. Our analysis reveals that the cre-
ation of incommensurables as a means to tackle 
such situations can take more than one form, and 
points to the link between forms of incommensu-
rability and the status of the actors who attempt 
to instrument it. 
One form of incommensurability creation fairly 
often depicted in the literature consists in attack-
ing the legitimacy of the commensuration attempt 
by invoking higher-order alternatives, often moral 
values, and organizing the battle between alter-
native incommensurable worldviews (Espeland, 
1998; Healy, 2004; Huault and Rainelli, 2011; 
Quinn, 2008; Zelizer, 1985). Another, which we 
observe in our empirical setting, seeks no support 
from existing paradigms, and invokes no alterna-
tive worldview as a basis for incommensurability. 
In fact the most striking feature of our findings 
is that claims that OTC markets are incommen-
surable, and therefore cannot and should not be 
subject to categories from the traditional industry 
register, are not supported by any attempt to draw 
on higher-order values or theories, be they moral 
or scientific. Our study thus identifies a form of 
incommensurability instrumentation that has 
received little attention in the literature, and is 
chiefly characterized by the absence of any clash 
between worldviews. 
The fact that the claim of incommensurability 
we describe does not seem to involve confronta-
tion of hostile worlds (Zelizer, 2011, p.357) has 
important consequences, which we believe can 
be usefully analyzed through the conceptualiza-
tion provided by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005). 
In particular, the kind of resistance we observe, 
with its careful avoidance of any reference to an 
alternative paradigm, can be interpreted as what 
Boltanski and Chiapello call a displacement. “Dis-
placement dispenses with reference to conven-
tions, and assumes neither exteriority nor gener-
ality (…) Displacement is a matter of the local, 
the factual, the circumstantial (…) It escapes 
the constraint of justification of a wholly gen-
eral kind, which assumes reference to a second 
level - precisely where in a logic of categorization, 
the convention of equivalence is situated” (2005, 
p.320). While categorization has to do with clar-
ification, formalization and stabilization, dis-
placement on the contrary feeds on self-nurtured 
ambiguity. Defining what is commensurate and 
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what is not - using a fuzzy justification apparatus 
that goes against the traditional industry regis-
ter - can therefore be viewed not only as a way 
to resist categorization or escape rules, but most 
importantly a way to escape the constraint of jus-
tification and defuse the critique. It clearly desta-
bilizes regulators seeking to establish some form 
of value system. 
Building on this, it appears that the specific form 
of incommensurability instrumentation we iden-
tify in this paper can be seen as an especially 
suitable strategy for powerful actors in a field. 
This bears links with the notion that categoriza-
tion is sometimes contested because of the loss 
of elite discretion that it fosters (Espeland and 
Stevens, 1998, p.330). As the legitimacy offered 
by standardization diminishes autonomy and dis-
cretion is replaced by externally-imposed disci-
plined methods, “quantitative technologies” can 
be “resisted by those whose authority depends on 
expert judgement, character or informal knowl-
edge” (Espeland and Stevens, 1998, p.331). Our 
work provides support for the idea that the cre-
ation of incommensurables as practiced by large 
financial institutions, rejecting categorization not 
in the name of higher order values or metrics but 
referring to undefined “specificities”, is probably 
typical of the kind of strategies favoured by pow-
erful incumbents. 
Finally, our study raises the question of whether 
the creation of incommensurables in the form 
identified in this paper is sustainable in the long 
term. Will the financial industry eventually have 
to offer an alternative paradigm for OTC mar-
kets in order to efficiently resist unwanted future 
regulatory change? The answer depends on the 
extent to which this industry will be drawn by 
regulatory pressure and increasing public scrutiny 
from what Boltanski (2009) calls a regime of dom-
ination into a regime of justification. As Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2005, p.318) discuss, this regime 
“obliges people to clarify and limit the grounds 
for their conflicts” and, as a result, requires them 
“to sacrifice ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, 
that which is displaced in favour of that which is 
stabilized through a process of categorization”.
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Objectives Indicators of results and 
impact
Relevant sections and 
articles
In the light of the general objectives 
above, the following specific objec-
tives are relevant: 
- Ensure a level playing field between 
market participants; 
- Increase market transparency for 
market participants; 
- Reinforce transparency towards 
and powers of regulators in key areas 
and increase coordination at Euro-
pean level; 
- Raise investor protection 
- Address organizational deficien-
cies and excessive risk taking or lack 
of control by investment firms and 
other market participants ABM/
ABB activity(ies) concerned
A report on the progress made in 
moving trading in standardized 
OTC derivatives to exchanges 
or electronic trading platforms; 
impact indicators should be the 
number of facilities engaging in 
OTC derivatives trading; and 
the trading volume of exchanges 
and platforms in OTC deri-
vatives as opposed to volume 
remaining over the counter; 
TITLE II: Authorization 
and operating conditions 
for investment firms
Chapter II (pages 75-98)
Section 3: Market transpa-
rency and integrity, Articles 
31, 32, 33.
Appendix 2 : Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Directive 2004/39/EC on the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Markets 
in Financial Instruments 
Excerpts from the text regarding OTC markets and transparency
Appendix 3: MiFID 2 Timeline
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Appendix 4: The MiFID 
Consultation Paper, 
Wording of the questions
The MiFID Consultation paper is dated 8 December 
2010 and entitled 
Public consultation - Review of the Markets in Finan-
cial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
It consists of an introduction and 8 sections related 
to 8 different topics, each section comprising deve-
lopments and numbered questions proposed for 
consultation:
1. Introduction.
2. Development in Market structures: Questions 1 to 26
3. Pre and Post Trade transparency: Questions 27 to 42
4. Data Consolidation: Questions 43 to 59
5. Measures specific to commodity derivatives: Ques-
tions 60 to 66
6. Transaction reporting: Questions 67 to 83
7. Investor protection and investment services: Ques-
tions 84 to 124
8. Further convergence of regulatory framework and 
of supervisory practices: Questions 125 to 141
9. Reinforcement of supervisory power in key areas: 
Questions 142 to 148
In the analysis, we focus on questions 8 to 12 from 
section 2 and 37 to 42 from section 3. The precise wor-
ding of these questions is as follows:
2. Development in Market 
structures:
(8) What is your opinion of the introduction of a 
requirement that all clearing eligible and sufficiently 
liquid derivatives should trade exclusively on regulated 
markets, MTFs, or organized trading facilities satis-
fying the conditions above? Please explain the reasons 
for your views. 
(9) Are the above conditions for an organized trading 
facility appropriate? Please explain the reasons for your 
views. 
(10) Which criteria could determine whether a deri-
vative is sufficiently liquid to be required to be traded 
on such systems? Please explain the reasons for your 
views. 
(11) Which market features could additionally be 
taken into account in order to achieve benefits in terms 
of better transparency, competition, market oversight, 
and price formation? Please be specific whether this 
could consider for instance, a high rate of concen-
tration of dealers in a specific financial instruments, 
a clear need from buy-side institutions for further 
transparency, or on demonstrable obstacles to effective 
oversight in a derivative trading OTC, etc.  
(12) Are there existing OTC derivatives that could be 
required to be traded on regulated markets, MTFs or 
organized trading facilities? If yes, please justify. Are 
there some OTC derivatives for which mandatory tra-
ding on a regulated market, MTF, or organized tra-
ding facility would be seriously damaging to investors 
or market participants? Please explain the reasons for 
your views. 
3. Pre and Post trade transparency
(37) What is your opinion on the suggested modifi-
cation to the MiFID framework directive in terms of 
scope of instruments and content of overarching trans-
parency requirements? Please explain the reasons for 
your views. 
(38) What is your opinion about the precise pre-trade 
information that regulated markets, MTFs and orga-
nized trading facilities as per section 2.2.3 above would 
have to publish on non-equity instruments traded on 
their system? Please be specific in terms of asset-class 
and nature of the trading system (e.g. order or quote 
driven).  
(39) What is your opinion about applying require-
ments to investment firms executing trades OTC to 
ensure that their quotes are accessible to a large num-
ber of investors, reflect a price which is not too far from 
market value for comparable or identical instrument 
traded on organized venues, and are binding below 
a certain transaction size? Please indicate what tran-
saction size would be appropriate for the various asset 
classes. 
(40) In view of calibrating the exact post-trade trans-
parency obligations for each asset class and type, what 
is your opinion of the suggested parameters, namely 
that the regime be transaction-based, and predica-
ted on a set of thresholds by transaction size? Please 
explain the reasons for your views. 
(41) What is your opinion about factoring in ano-
ther measure besides transaction size to account for 
liquidity? 
(42) What is your opinion about whether a specific 
additional factor (e.g. issuance size, frequency of tra-
ding) could be considered for determining when the 
regime or a threshold applies? Please justify. Could 
further identification and flagging of OTC trades be 
useful? Please explain the reasons. 
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